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Preface

O ne of the few memories from my introductory philosophy course iti collegeover 35 years ago-is the parable of the blind men and the elephant.
Four blind men come across an elephant. They decide to feel
the elephant to determine what sort of creature it is. One blind man
feels the back leg of the elephant. He says, "An elephan t is like a
tree." The second blind man feels the trunk. H e says, "An elephant
is like a snake." The third blind man feels the tail. H e says, "An elephant is like a rope." The fourth blind man is afraid. He doesn't feel
the elephant at all.
The three blind men argue a long time about what an elephant is and based on their own personal experience each is right.1
This affected me greatly, when I first heard it at age 18, a nd it h as stayed
with me to this day. It seems to explain so much of our social, intrapsychic,
political, and cultural behavior, especially the "disconnects" we all frequently experience in everyday work and professional life. When I started
writing about the meretricious allure of "ordinary common sense" in legal
theory,2 I realized that that parable helped explain our distorted thinking
processes that have led to such incoherence in, for example, our insanity
defense policies.3
When I read the ma nuscript of Bruce A rrigo's brilliant new book, Punishing the Mentally Ill: A Critical Analysis of Law and Psychiatry, the parable
came back to me in a very different way. For what Professor Arrigo has done
is to expose the fa ilures and shortcomings of those methodologies that insist
on Looking at the "men tal health system" through one perspective ·only-be
th at the clinical, the legal, the behavioral, the empirical, the political, or the
theoretical. Professor Arrigo-who demonstrates in this book a prodigious
knowledge of all of these approaches- aims to do more, and he sets out that
aim clearly.
·
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In the first pages of his Introduction he says this:
I am interested in exploring the depths of punishment enacted
first unconsciously in symbolic form and subsequently legitimized,
knowingly or not, in socia l effect. In other words, this project seeks
to link clinicolgeal practices (e.g., predicting dangerousness, executing the menta lly ill) with unspoken desires (e.g., the metaphysics of
presence, the social control thesis), revealing how ideology and c ircumscribed knowledge inform the behavior of law and psychiatry.◄

His thesis is that we cannot possibly understand the mental health system
without confronting ideology, desires, and unconscious imagery. He also argues
that this perception contro ls whether we are looking at civil or criminal mental
disability law, at institutional or community mental disability law policy, or
questions of mental health advocacy. And I agree. By framing his arguments as
he does, he recognizes that what is rea lly going on in mental disability policy
decision-making is complex, a nd is informed by a discourse that is highly dependent on our understanding of the depths of our punitive urges, and the roots of
our need to contro l those perceived to be deviant. 5
Professor Arrigo shows how these attitudes inform o ur clinical policies and
out legal policies, whether we are looking at involuntary civil commitment, the
provision of community treatment, the right to refuse treatment, an insanity
defense trial, or the decision making involved in determining whether a person
with mental disability can be executed. By do ing this, he forces us to leave the
comfortably narrow cocoons of our own substantive specialties (and professional
calling), and makes us understand how a set of unconsciously integrated attitudes explains why we do what we do-especia lly in the name of the state- in
the way we deal with persons with mental disability.
I am interested in all of the topics chat Professor Arrigo has bro ught to the
scholarly table, and have written about many of them. 6 I was most interested,
however, in his chapter on "the ethics of advocacy for the mentally ill." This is
a topic that has been severely underconsidered over the years,7 and about which
there has truly been little that is origina l or controversial. Professor Arrigo's thesis here is clear: "Each time the mentally ill (or their representatives) engage the
law, they strengthen and bolster their dependence on it, and, further, become
somewhat disempowered because of it."8 This, he concludes, establishes the "profound paradox" faced by persons with mental disability: "to endure without
rights (as the law has taken them away), o r seek rights fro m the law, which, in
turn, fortifies the power of the law."9 And this leads him to his ultimate question
on this topic:
If advocacy in mental health law is anchored by clinicolegal
interpretations of rights, illness, competency, and the like, and if
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confinement decisions hinge, fundamen tally, on an appeal to established strucn,res of civil a nd criminal institutional authority, what
room, if any, is legitimately left for the disparate voices of the psychiatrically disordered? Indeed, given these constructed realit ies, on
whose behalf is the advocacy truly init iated?10
This is, of course, very unsettling, perhaps more so to someone like me
who spe nt 11 years represent ing persons with mental disabilities (3 as a Public Defender, specializing in cases involving incompetency status determinations and insanity trials, and 8 as director of the NJ Divisio n of Menta l H ealth
Advocacy, a sta te-funded, subcabinet office vested with the power to provide
legal representa tion in both individual and class action matters for persons
with mental disability), who, for the past 17 years, has taugh t students, in both
classroom a nd clinical settings, to do the same, 11 and who employs different
modes of Legal analysis as a means of expanding the rights of persons with mental disabilities t hrough mental healt h advocacy. 12 Professor Arrigo's arguments
here "push the envelope" in directions new to interdisciplinary scholarship,
and will, I hope, inaugurate a new and important dia logue in the mental
health "rights community."
Fo r the past decade or so, I have focused my own writing on what 1 term
sanism as well as what I term pretextualir:y. Simply put, sanism is an irrational
prejudice of t he same qua lity and character of other irrational prejudices that
cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, ho mophobia, and ethnic bigotry. It infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering
practices. Sanism is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based
predominantly on stereotype, myth, superstition, and de individualization, and is
sustained and perpetuated by o ur use of a lleged "ordinary common sense" (OCS)
and heuristic reason ing in an unconscious response to events both in everyday:
life and in the legal process.
And, "pretextuality" means that courts accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial disho nesty and engage similarly in dishonest (frequently meretricious) decision-making, specifically where witnesses, especially expen
witnesses, show a "high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order
to achieve desired ends." This pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants in the judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans
participants, and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blase judging, and, at times, perj urious and/o r corrupt testifying.13
I turned to these concepts as a way of explaining why and how mental disability law has developed as it has. And I believe that the perniciousness and
malignance of these concepts do so explain that law, whether we are looking at
assisted o utpatient commitment law, sexually violent predato r laws, assessing
defendants' competence to plead guilty, the right of institutionalized patients to
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sexua l interaction, o r any of the other "standard" topics of mental disability law
about which courts decide cases and scholars write articles.
l have sought-especially in my earlier writings of the topic-to explain
the historical, religious, and political sources of sanism, and how, to a great
extent, these sources still animate current attitudes and behaviors. 14 Bue, having
said that, l always have wondered if there were still "something else" to be added
to help solve chis most difficult of social policy puzzles. Professor A rrigo provides
that "something else" in this book, and he does so clearly, provocatively, and
persuasively. It is o ne that we will be ch inking about for a long, long time.
Michael L. Perlin
Professor, New York Law School

